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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,

:

Case No. 870094

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are set
forth in Appellant's Opening Brief at 1-5.

Mr. Stilling takes this

opportunity to reply to Point I of Respondent's Brief,

issues to

which Mr. Stilling does not reply are adequately covered in
Appellant's Opening Brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Filing warrants with Weber County after filing a detainer
with Oregon Officials was a request for temporary custody, thereby
triggering the requirement that Mr. Stilling be tried on those
charges within 120 days. Because Salt Lake County failed to bring
Mr. Stilling to trial within 120 days, the matter should have been
dismissed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS
THE CHARGES WHERE THE STATE FAILED TO
BRING MR, STILLING TO TRIAL WITHIN THE
REQUISITE 120 DAYS,
(Reply to Point I in Respondent's Brief)
In responding to Mr. Stilling's opening brief, the State
strained the facts and mischaracterized the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers ("I.A.D." or "Agreement") and supporting case law.

The

State incorrectly analyzed several major points in addressing this
issue.
Firstf the State incorrectly introduces the I.A.D. by
stating that its purpose "is to provide a mechanism for prisoners
serving a term of imprisonment to insist upon speedy and final
disposition of untried charges that are the subjects of detainers so
that prison rehabilitation programs initiated for a prisoner's
benefit will not be disrupted or precluded by the existence of the
untried charges.'1

Brief of Respondent at 12.

In characterizing the

purpose of the I.A.D. as solely to further rehabilitation effortsf
the State ignores the overall purpose of the I.A.D. which is to
provide a fair and speedy means for disposition.
Article I of the I.A.D. outlines its purpose.

It states:

The party states find that charges outstanding
against a prisoner, detainers based on untried
indictments9 informations or complaints9 and
difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons
already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce
uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner
treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is
the policy of the party states and the purpose of
this agreement to encourage the expeditious and
- 2

-

orderly disposition of such charges and
determination of the proper status of any and all
detainers based on untried indictments, information
or complaints. The party states also find that
proceedings with reference to such charges and
detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction,
cannot properly be had in the absence of
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose
of this agreement to provide such co-operative
procedures.
In United States v. Mauroy 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834,
56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978), the United States Supreme Court outlined the
purpose of the I.A.D. and the history behind its adoption.

The

Mauro Court pointed out that the I.A.D. sets out its purpose in
Article I then stated:

"Accordingly, its purpose is to encourage

the expeditious disposition of such charges and to provide
cooperative procedures among member states to facilitate such
disposition." Mauro, 436 U.S. at 351.

In Stroble v. Anderson, 587

F.2d 830, 837 (6th Cir. 1978), the Court echoed this statement.
also Dorsey v. State, 490 N.E.2d 260, 264 (Ind. 1986).

See

Hence the

focus is on speedy disposition of charges and not the interference
with rehabilitation that the State emphasizes.
In addition, in Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct.
703, 66 L.Ed.2d 642 (1981), the United States Supreme Court pointed
out that the legislative history of the Agreement indicated "that a
primary purpose of the Agreement is to protect prisoners against
whom detainers are outstanding."

449 U.S. at 448. The Court quoted

the House and Senate Reports which stated:
n

[A] prisoner who has had a detainer lodged
against him is seriously disadvantaged by such
action. He is in custody and therefore in no
position to seek witnesses or to preserve his
defense. He must often be kept in close custody and
is ineligible for desirable work assignments. What
- 3
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is more, when detainers are filed against a prisoner
he sometimes loses interest in institutional
opportunities because he must serve his sentence
without knowing what additional sentences may lie
before him, or when, if ever, he will be in a
position to employ the education and skills he may
be developing." HR Rep. No. 91-1018, p.3 (1970)? S.
Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 3 (1970).
Id,, at 449.
Therefore the State's emphasis on the initiation and
continuation of prison rehabilitation programs in outlining the
purpose of the Agreement is incorrect.

The purpose of the

Agreement, as repeatedly stated by various courts, is to allow for
the speedy and orderly disposition of detainers so that "a prisoner
who has had a detainer lodged against him is [not] seriously
disadvantaged by such action."

Id.

While the disadvantage to a

prisoner of having a detainer lodged against him may include
interference with rehabilitation programs, it also includes
difficulty in preparing a defense, stricter conditions of custody,
lack of eligibility for desirable work assignments and the
psychological effect of uncertainties associated with unresolved
cases.
The State suggests Mr. Stilling was not in a position to
participate in prison rehabilitation programming at the Oregon State
Prison.

Respondent's Brief at 12.

supported by the record.

Such a statement is not

Furthermore, the I.A.D. does not require a

defendant to establish that he was unable to participate in
rehabilitation programs while a detainer was lodged in order to make
the I.A.D. applicable.

By its terms, the Agreement was invoked when

Salt Lake County filed its detainer with the Oregon State Prison.
- 4
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The State's introductory paragraph also suggests that the
I.A.D. is a mechanism for "prisoners . . . to insist" on speedy
disposition.

Respondent's Brief at 12. The focus also incorrectly

characterizes the Agreement since the I.A.D. provides a mechanism
not only for prisoners to request speedy disposition as set forth
in Article III, but also a mechanism, along with responsibilities,
by which a receiving state can obtain custody of a prisoner in
another state and dispose of pending charges.
The I.A.D. was created and entered into by the states as
a means by which the states could deal effectively with prisoners
who had pending charges in various jurisdictions in a workable,
cooperative and organized manner.

See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 351.

Articles III and IV demonstrate that both the state and the prisoner
have options, rights and obligations under the Act.

The State's

attempt in its brief to label the purpose of the I.A.D. as being a
narrow prisoner option only purpose is self serving and erroneous.
The State also attempts to obfuscate the issue before the
Court by characterizing Mr. Stilling as a pre-trial detainer rather
than a prisoner of the Oregon State Prison system.

See Respondent's

Brief at 12. While the State is correct in pointing out that the
I.A.D. does not apply to pretrial detainees, Mr. Stilling was in
fact a prisoner of the Oregon State system who was in the temporary
custody of Utah officials pursuant to the I.A.D.; the fact that he
was awaiting trial in Weber County on the Weber County charges does
not change that status.

- 5
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The State rationalizes that since Mr. Stilling, "for the
most part, was being held as a pre-trial detainee in the Weber
County Jail" (Respondent's Brief at 12), he was precluded from
participating in rehabilitation programs, since no such programs
were available at the jail. This position ignores the obvious—that
while Mr. Stilling was in temporary custody in Otah he was unable to
participate in programs in Oregon and otherwise disadvantaged by the
pending charges.

Furthermore, the Salt Lake County detention

extended the length of time that Mr. Stilling was disadvantaged in
this way.
The State contends that Salt Lake County officials acted
diligently and promptly in attempting to bring Mr. Stilling to trial
and that Mr. Stilling is now seeking to punish Salt Lake County for
its diligence.

Respondent's Brief at 13. On the contrary, while

Salt Lake County acted somewhat promptly in filing its warrants in
Weber County on September 19th, shortly after Mr. Stilling's August
17th arrival in Weber County (R. 303), it did not act promptly in
bringing him to trial*

As outlined in the opening brief at 2-3,

Mr. Stilling was not transported to Salt Lake County until January
14, 1985, 118 days after Mr. Stilling's arrival in Utah (R. 93).
The case was set for trial on March 4, 1985, in violation of Article
IV of the I.A.D. since it was more than 120 days after Salt Lake
County filed the warrants requesting custody of Mr. Stilling.
Furthermore, Mr. Stilling is not attempting to "punish" Salt Lake
County? he is simply attempting to carry out the provisions of the
I.A.D.

- 6
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The State also contends that Article IV "is the
prosecutor's half of the I.A.D." Respondent's Brief at 14. The
State then suggests that any right of a defendant might have to
redress falls under Article III of the Act.

Implicit in the State's

analysis is the position that a violation of Article IV cannot form
the basis for a prisonerfs claim, and that a prisoner must rely on
Article III for redress under the Act.

Such a position is without

merit and contrary to the plain language of the statute and case law.
Article IV of the I.A.D. states in part:
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be
construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which
he may have to contest the legality of his delivery
as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such
delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground
that the executive authority of the sending state
has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such
delivery.
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment,
information or complaint contemplated hereby prior
to the prisoner's being returned to the original
place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e)
hereof, such indictment, information or complaint
shall not be of any further force or effect, and the
court shall enter an order dismissing the same with
prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. S77-29-5, Article IV(d)(e) (1953 as amended).
Article V of the Agreement clarifies that the remedy for
a*failure to bring a defendant to trial within the time periods set
forth in Article III or Article IV is dismissal.

Article V(c)

states:
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or
fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or
in the event that an action on the indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which the
detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial
within the period provided in Article III or Article
IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction
- 7
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where the indictment, information or complaint has
been pending shall enter an order dismissing the
same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon
shall cease to be of any force or effect.
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5, Article V(c) (1953 as amended).
Moreover, various courts have acknowledged that Article
IV, while providing rights to the states, also establishes
responsibilities.

As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in

United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 352, Article IV imposes two
limitations on states, one of which is a requirement that the
prisoner be tried within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in
the state.

Hence, Article IV does not solely benefit the state, and

dismissal is the appropriate remedy where the state fails to bring a
prisoner to trial within 120 days.
In addition to mischaracterizing the purpose and effect
of the I.A.D., the state mischaracterizes Judge Dee's order of April
10, 1985, and statements made in defense counsel's Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal (See Respondent's Brief at 15, n. 4 and
16-17).

While for the purposes of the Petition for Interlocutory

Review, defense counsel stated that Mr. Stilling "will assume. . .
that those conclusions are correct!.]"

(See Petition for Permission

to Appeal from Interlocutory Order, p. 6 contained in Addendum A to
Appellant's Opening Brief), such statement was limited to that
Petition.

In his April 10, 1985 Order, Judge Dee found that Salt

Lake County had not legally obtained custody of Mr. Stilling, not
that the I.A.D. had not been invoked.

- 8 -

The State relies on Williams v, State# 426 So.2d 1121
(Fla. App. 1983), petition for review denied, 437 So.2d 677 (Fla.
1983) claiming that it "contains facts virtually identical to the
instant case.11

Respondent's Brief at 17. However, Williams is

distinguishable from the instant case since the facts in Williams
established that n[n]either the New York authorities, nor Williams,
nor Marion County notified authorities that Williams was in Florida
[

] w and "Union County did not even know that Williams was in the

state of Florida."

Williams, 426 So.2d at 1122.

In the present

case, Salt Lake County knew that Mr. Stilling was in Utah and knew
that he had been transferred there from Oregon since Salt Lake
County had filed a detainer with Oregon officials shortly before it
filed its warrants in Weber County.

Furthermore, as argued in

Appellant's opening brief at 8-9, the facts suggest that Oregon
fulfilled its notification requirements pursuant to Article IV(b),
and any adverse consequences as a result of a failure to comply on
the part of Oregon, should be charged to Salt Lake County and not
Mr. Stilling.

In the present circumstances where Article IV(b)

required Oregon to notify Salt Lake County that Mr. Stilling was in
Weber County and Salt Lake County in fact knew he was in Weber
County and acted on that knowledge, the decision in Williams is not
applicable.
The State's assertion that "[a]ssuming Oregon State
Prison did not issue an inmate status certificate to Salt Lake
County officials under Article IV(b) to notify them of defendant's
temporary transfer to Utah, such would not provide a basis for

- 9
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dismissal of the charges against defendant."

(Respondent's Brief at

17) is not supported by the facts or the clear majority of case law.
The State apparently cites State v. Barefield, 735 P.2d
1339 (Wash. App. 1987), Coit v. Statef 440 So.2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983), State v. Clark, 222 Kan. 65, 563 Po2d 1028 (1977) and
Commonwealth v. Gonce, 320 Pa. Super Ct. 19, 466 A.2d 1039 (1983) in
support of this proposition.

The argument is not compelling for

three reasons.
First, the facts suggest that Oregon officials did inform
Salt Lake County as required since Salt Lake County filed its
warrants shortly after Mr. Stilling's arrival.
Opening Brief at 8-9.)

(See Appellant's

Second, as the Court acknowledged in

Barefield, 735 P.2d at 1346, there is a split of authority as to
whether a failure to comply with notice provisions requires
dismissal.

The Barefield Court cited People v. Lincoln, 42 Colo.

App. 512, 601 P.2d 641 (1979) for the proposition that "compliance
with notice provisions is mandatory" and People v. Office, 126 Mich.
App. 597, 337 N.W. 592 (1982) for the proposition that "failure to
bring formal charges against defendant violates good faith and
spirit of I.A.D."

Id. at 1346.

Finally, and most importantly, whether Oregon failed to
give notice as required is not the critical issue.

The critical

concern is that the State failed to bring Mr. Stilling to trial
within 120 of filing its warrants with Weber County, thereby
requesting temporary custody of him after having previously filed a
detainer with Oregon officials.

The Agreement explicitly mandates

dismissal where a receiving state fails to meet the 120 day limit.

- 10 -

The State speculates that Mr. Stilling was unavailable
for trial in Salt Lake County during the time he was in Weber County
awaiting trial (Respondent's Brief at 19-20).

However, while the

I.A.D. does provide that the 120 day time period will be tolled
while the defendant is unavailable, it explicitly provides that the
trial judge shall make any determination as to whether a defendant
is unavailable and if so, the amount of time so tolled.
Ann. §77-29-5, Article VI(a) (1953 as amended).

Utah Code

In this case, there

is no finding that Mr. Stilling was unavailable for trial in Salt
Lake County while housed in Weber County and the record in fact
indicates the contrary—that Mr. Stilling was available from
September 19, 1984 through early January, 1985. Transcript, March
13, 1987, p. 25.
Further, the record indicates that prisoners are often
transported between Weber and Salt Lake County for trial and that
Mr. Stilling was in fact transported to Salt Lake County on at least
two occasions prior to entering his guilty pleas on the Weber County
cases on February 13, 1985. On January 14, 1985, Mr. Stilling was
transported to Salt Lake County for an initial appearance (R. 93).
He was again transported on January 29, 1985 for a preliminary
hearing (R. 17). Moreover, a review of Mr. Stilling's Weber County
case, as set forth in State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d 348 (Utah 1985)
indicates that after Salt Lake County filed its warrants with Weber
County, Mr. Stilling made at most three brief appearances in Court
in Weber County—a Motion to Continue on October 26th, a Motion to
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Dismiss on January 4, 1985, and an entry of guilty pleas on February
13# 1985.1

Hence, Mr. Stilling was available at all other times and

the State's speculation to the contrary is erroneous.
The State cites Onited States v. Royy 830 F.2d 628, 634-5
(7th Cir. 1987) (Respondent's Brief at 20) in support of its
hypothesis that Mr. Stilling was unavailable for trial in Salt Lake
County the entire time he was held in Weber County.

Roy, however,

involved a defendant who was in state custody while a pending
detainer on federal charges existed.

Under such circumstances, the

defendant would have to be removed from state to federal custody,
pursuant to the I.A.D. (just as Mr. Stilling was placed in the
temporary custody of Utah from Oregon) in order to be tried.

Such a

circumstance is completely different from the circumstance in Mr.
Stilling1s case where the State of Utah was prosecuting both the
Weber and Salt Lake County cases and Mr. Stilling was in fact
available and actually transported to Salt Lake County while the
Weber County charges were still pending.

Hence, Roy is inapplicable

to this case.
Finally, the State attempts to distinguish United States
v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978) by arguing that Mr. Stilling, unlike
the defendant in Mauro, made no request for speedy disposition and
Salt Lake County made no request for temporary custody directly to
Oregon Officials (Respondent's Brief at 21). However, pursuant to

1

Prior to the filing of the Salt Lake County warrants, Mr. Stilling
apparently made an initial appearance, thereafter waived his
preliminary hearing and was arraigned in District Court. The record
in this case suggests the possibility of another brief appearance in
Weber County on November 2, 1984. Transcript, March 13, 1987, p. 45.
- 12 -

Article IV, the state has the responsibility of proceeding in a
timely manner, and whether a defendant makes a request for speedy
disposition has no bearing on whether the matter should be dismissed
under that Article,

In addition, the record indicates that Mr.

Stilling repeatedly questioned his lawyer on the Weber County
charges and the prosecutor in that case regarding the status of the
Salt Lake County charges.

He also called the Salt Lake Legal

Defender Association and was told that office could not represent
him until he was arraigned on the Salt Lake County charges and the
court appointed the office to represent him.
1987, p. 25-26. 2

Transcript March 13,

Hence, Mr. Stilling was not represented on the

Salt Lake County charges until his arraignment on January 14, 1985.
In addition, the Mauro Court established that the term
"written request for temporary custody" would not be given an unduly
restrictive meaning.

Ijd. at 362.

The Mauro Court held that the

"United States is bound by the Agreement when it activates its
provisions by filing a detainer against a state prisoner and then
obtains this custody by means of a writ of habeas corpus and pro se
quendum".

Mauro, 436 U.S. at 349.

In reaching its decision in

Mauro, the United States Supreme Court pointed out that the concern
was not the means by which the United States obtained custody after
filing a detainer, but the fact that"the United States is able to
obtain temporary custody of the prisoner."

2

Mauro, 436 U.S. at 362.

This is the procedure generally followed for appointment of
counsel for indigent cases in Salt Lake County. Most indigent
defendants are not represented prior to the first appearance in
Circuit Court in Salt Lake County.
- 13 -

In the instant case, Salt Lake County took the easiest
route for obtaining custody of Mr. Stilling by filing warrants with
Weber County even though it was aware that Mr. Stilling was an
Oregon prisoner.

At the time Salt Lake County filed the warrants,

it believed it could obtain temporary custody of Mr. Stilling in
that manner.

The State now attempts to argue for a strict

interpretation of the term "request for temporary custody,M and
ignores its own efforts in attempting to obtain custody of Mr.
Stilling.

Such an argument undermines the fairness rationale behind

the I.A.D.
In this case, where Salt Lake County filed a detainer
with Oregon officials, thereby activating the I.A.D. and thereafter
made a request for temporary custody by filing its warrants with
Weber County, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case
after Salt Lake County failed to bring Mr. Stilling to trial within
120 days after the warrants were filed.

The State lost track of the

case (R. 1720) for more than 120 days, and thereby violated the
provisions of Article IV, mandating dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, and all of the reasons
set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief and at oral argument, Mr.
Stilling respectfully requests that this Court reverse his case and
remand the matter for dismissal, or, in the alternative, a new
trial.

Mr. Stilling also requests that this Court vacate his

sentence and remand the case to the District Court with an order
directing that court to correct its illegal sentence.
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